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IN SEARCH OF A HIGHER STANDARD:
RETHINKING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
OF WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES
Stefan J. Padfield
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respects has he failed
to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his
deviation from duty?
Justice Frankfurter'
[O]ur corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in
response to, indeed in anticipation of evolving concepts and needs.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals have made us aware of the abuses that
can occur when corporate officers and directors succumb to greed in
pursuit of the ever-increasing share price.3 Due to the power dynamics
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1. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
2. 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985).
3. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 456, 461-
62 (2004) (attributing at least some of the recent corporate scandals to governance
failures involving directors' lack of faithful management as fiduciaries); Kathleen Hale,
Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L.
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inherent in the parent/wholly-owned subsidiary context, the wholly-
owned subsidiary is particularly vulnerable to manipulation.4 Imagine,
for example, that you are a director of a wholly-owned subsidiary. You
suspect that the parent company wants to loot the subsidiary or have the
subsidiary engage in various sweetheart deals with the parent in order to
improve the parent's bottom line.' What should you do? You certainly
have a fiduciary duty to the parent. But you also have a duty to the
REv. 823, 856 n.122 (2003) ("Potentially, after the 2002 corporate debacles, people
might be more inclined to question the primacy of shareholders' interests. [Professor]
Gordon points out the ways in which the Enron bankruptcy challenged very basic
assumptions about conducting business in America during an era of 'shareholders
capitalism."' (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1233, 1234 (2002))).
4. Cf Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 313 n.28 (1939) ("In all the experience of
the law, there has never been a more prolific breeder of fraud than the one-man
corporation. It is a favorite device for the escape of personal liability." (quoting trial
court opinion)); Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial Failures: Enron and More,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 423, 450-451 (2004) (pointing out that while "[i]n itself, a
complex structure is not problematic," with many good reasons existing "for a firm to
operate with a family of parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates," many of the firms
involved in recent corporate scandals "appeared particularly prone to using complex
structure").
5. See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 287,338 n.9 (1996) ("A recent case in which a holding company 'looted'
its subsidiary insurance company, allegedly to prop up the failing activities of its other
subsidiaries illustrates the point."); cf. id. at 290 ("[I]t is not unusual for subsidiaries to
sell their products at reduced prices to their parents, to buy goods and services from
their parents at inflated prices, to pay excessive management fees to their parents, to
declare excessive dividends, or to otherwise to engage in transactions at the request of
their parents that the subsidiaries never would have undertaken on their own." (citing
Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of the
'Source-of-Strength' Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1383
(1991))); William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of
Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1129 n.49 ("Section 5.11 [of the
ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance] sweeps in most majority-to-minority fact
patterns not involving transactions. It covers, among other things, the parent's (a)
misusing a corporate position to obtain a tax benefit at a subsidiary's expense, (b)
misusing dividend policy, (c) precluding a subsidiary from engaging in a business
opportunity, (d) precluding a subsidiary from competing with a parent, and (e)
obtaining profit from the sale of property to the exclusion of other shareholders.").
6. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988) ("[I]n a parent and wholly owned subsidiary context, the directors of the
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wholly-owned subsidiary as an entity.' In addition, you may (depending
on the circumstances) have duties to the subsidiary's creditors,8 as well
as certain government regulators.9  Finally, the interests of other
subsidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the best interests
of the parent and its shareholders"). But see, infra note 7.
7. First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10, 26 (D.D.C. 1998)
("Even assuming the Virginia courts would follow Anadarko, they would understand it
to apply only to the question of who are the shareholders to whom the directors of a
wholly-owned subsidiary owe duties when the corporation is being spun off.... [T]he
directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary owe the corporation fiduciary duties, just as
they would any other corporation. As a result the subsidiary has standing to sue for
breach of those duties."). Cf Gouvin, supra note 5, at 294-95:
Well-established law in Delaware and other jurisdictions holds that the directors of
corporations owe fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders. The
Delaware Supreme Court has recently stated that these two duties are 'of equal and
independent significance,' but case law reveals that the directors' duty to the
corporation as an entity usually predominates over their duty to the shareholders.
Only in certain situations will the duty to the shareholders predominate over the duty
to the corporation. If the law of parent and subsidiary follows corporate law
generally, it would appear that in some situations the subsidiary board should make
decision in the best interests of the parent corporation as shareholder, and at other
times the directors should take action in the best interest of the subsidiary as a
corporation. (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del.
1993)).
8. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307 (1939) (stating that a director's fiduciary duty is
"designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the corporation -
creditors as well as stockholders"); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784,
789 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("The existence of the fiduciary duties at the moment of insolvency
may cause directors to choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate
enterprise rather than any single group interested in the corporation at a point in time
when shareholders' wishes should not be the directors [sic] only concern.").
9. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 290:
The split between the parent's interests and the interests of the subsidiary can be
especially pronounced when the subsidiary is a participant in a highly regulated
industry. Often the directors of the regulated subsidiary will find themselves tom
between a desire to make decisions in the best interest of the subsidiary as an
independent corporation consistent with the larger regulatory scheme, and a
countervailing desire to make decisions in accordance with the wishes of the parent
corporation.
Id. at 318:
The concern over subsidiary director liability to nonshareholders is not a purely
academic enterprise. For example, in many cases the directors of subsidiary banks
have found themselves subject to liability to the FDIC. The chain of events leading to
liability begins when a bank fails and the FDIC is appointed as receiver. As receiver,
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constituencies may need to be considered.10
You are faced with a dilemma.1 You can either: serve the parent
and risk being sued by creditors, regulators and/or other constituencies;
1 2
serve the subsidiary and risk being sued and/or fired by the parent; or,
you can quit.1 3 Where shall you look for guidance? This is obviously an
important area of the law,1 4 but due in large part to the fact that,
generally speaking, only the parent has standing to sue the board of its
wholly-owned subsidiary (and it is much easier to just replace the
directors), it is an area of the law that is far from well-developed. 5 The
Delaware Supreme Court has said that "in a parent and wholly owned
subsidiary context, the directors of the subsidiary are obligated only to
manage the affairs of the subsidiary in the best interests of the parent
and its shareholders.' ' 16 Meanwhile, the United States District Court for
the FDIC must maximize the value of assets owned by the failed bank, including any
causes of action the bank may have. Therefore, the FDIC may bring claims on behalf
of the failed bank against the bank's directors for failure to take action in the best
interest of the bank.
10. Forty-one states have enacted statutes that permit directors to consider the
impact of various corporate actions on non-shareholder constituents as part of the
directors' decision-making process. See Hale, supra note 3, at 833. Connecticut's
statute is mandatory. CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 33-756. Case law also permits
consideration of various stakeholders. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
11. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 293 (recognizing "fiduciary Catch-22" for
directors who find themselves "torn between two duties").
12. Id. at291:
In the litigation that followed the wave of bank failures in the late 1980s and early
1990s, many directors faced personal liability for bank losses. Although they had
made decisions in the best interest of their sole shareholder, the directors often found
themselves the target of lawsuits instituted by nonshareholder constituents involved in
the corporate enterprise, including the banking regulators, customers, and other
parties.
13. Id. at 293.
14. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10, 26 at n. 17 (expressing hope that the "perplexing
issue" of the duties of wholly-owned subsidiary directors will become the subject of "a
more robust discourse").
15. Id. at 26 ("[T]he duties of the directors of wholly owned subsidiaries have not
been articulated in the law.") (quoting Gouvin, supra note 5, at 324); see Gouvin, supra
note 5, at 324 ("In part, this lack of clarity can be attributed to a lack of legal precedent,
which, in turn, can be attributed to the fact that a parent corporation is unlikely to sue
the board of its wholly owned subsidiary.").
16. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988).
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the District of Columbia has said that "the directors of a wholly-owned
subsidiary owe the corporation fiduciary duties, just as they would any
other corporation."' 7 As for legal commentators, one has argued that a
fundamental rights analysis should be applied to differentiate
"legitimate" from "illegitimate" shareholder demands in the wholly-
owned subsidiary context.18 Another commentator has suggested that
due to the uniquely insulated nature of the relationship between a parent
company and its wholly-owned subsidiary, directors of wholly-owned
subsidiaries should be held to a lesser standard than other directors-
perhaps all we should expect of them is to act as mere agents of the
parent.' 9 In this article, however, I will argue that precisely because the
relationship between a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary
is so insulated, directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries should be held to
higher fiduciary standards than other directors. In the alternative, I
argue that a derivative right to enforce the wholly-owned subsidiary
director's duty to the corporation should be granted to stakeholders.
Following this Introduction, Part II of this article will examine the
historical background and theories of the corporation generally. This
examination of the historical background of the corporation will serve to
remind us that the state's interest in bestowing limited liability upon
shareholders and immortality upon the corporate entity is not merely to
make shareholders wealthy, but rather to utilize shareholder wealth
aggrandizement as a means to foster economic growth generally. z We
shall see how both the so-called "race to the bottom" and the takeover
17. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
18. Emma D. Enriquez, Comment, Honor Thy Shareholder At All Costs? Towards
A Better Understanding of the Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Wholly-Owned
Subsidiaries, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 97, 114-15 (2003).
19. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 304-05:
Since the parent entirely controls the subsidiary's management, it is unrealistic to
expect the subsidiary directors to act solely in the best interests of the subsidiary
corporation even though such action would ordinarily be required for corporate
directors. Instead of requiring these directors to behave as if the subsidiary were an
independent entity, the law should be more realistic and allow them to do the bidding
of the parent or shareholder.
20. Cf William J. Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV.
421, 455 (1999) (asserting belief that "the granting of limited liability to a parent
corporation encourages investment and economic development, producing a net benefit
for society as a whole").
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boom of the 1980s laid the groundwork for the modem stakeholder
empowerment movement in corporate law. We will furthermore be
reminded that:
Companies sprang from the loins of the state. Even when they were
set free in the mid-nineteenth century, they still had to secure what
might be called "a franchise from society." . . . To keep doing
business, the modem company still needs a franchise from society,
and the terms of that franchise still matter enormously.
21
Meanwhile, our examination of the theories of the corporation will
demonstrate that supporting expansion of the fiduciary duties of wholly-
owned subsidiary directors is in accord with both of the two main
schools of corporate law theorists: communitarians and contractarians.
Part III will examine fiduciary duties of corporate directors
generally, providing a framework within which to examine the fiduciary
duties of directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries specifically. The
conclusion of this section is that: (1) the law of fiduciary obligations of
corporate directors is an evolving one; (2) the historical norm of
shareholder primacy, which justified using shareholder interests as a
proxy for other duties, has come under increasing scrutiny; and (3) the
foundation for duties running to non-shareholder constituents is already
in place.
After having discussed the history and theories of the corporation
generally, as well as fiduciary duties of corporate directors generally,
Part IV will move on to discuss some of the unique historical and legal
aspects of the subsidiary entity specifically. This will help us to see that
the law generally treats subsidiaries as separate entities, with all of the
concomitant rights and responsibilities inherent therein. Therefore, if a
parent corporation wishes to avail itself of the benefits of operating such
a separate entity, it cannot simultaneously avoid having the directors of
that entity fulfill their various statutorily-imposed duties.
In Part V, I will discuss why the unique position of directors of
wholly-owned subsidiaries warrants subjecting them to expanded
fiduciary duties. Specifically, I argue that several of the factors
21. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 182, 186 (Modem Library, 2003) (hereinafter,
THE COMPANY). The use of the term "franchise" in the text should not be confused
with a monopoly right. See infra note 22.
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justifying not extending fiduciary duties to other constituencies such as
employees, customers, and members of the community generally are
lacking in the wholly-owned subsidiary context. First of all, the power
dynamics at work in the parent/wholly-owned subsidiary context are
such as to seriously impugn the directoral independence that is so often
viewed as a bar to serious challenge of directoral decisionmaking.
Second, there are no large institutional investors at the level of the
wholly-owned subsidiary to counteract the forces working upon the
directors of the wholly-owned subsidiary to simply do the bidding of the
parent. Third, there is no market for corporate control operating at the
level of the wholly-owned subsidiary to provide an incentive for
directors of that entity to maximize its performance. Finally, the parent
is too removed from the stakeholders to allow us to assume that it will
give sufficient, if any, consideration to their interests. All these factors
create inefficiencies best addressed by the imposition of fiduciary duties
to stakeholders upon the wholly-owned subsidiary's directors.
Having concluded that the unique dynamics of the wholly-owned
subsidiary warrant imposition of additional fiduciary duties upon its
directors, Part VI provides alternatives for implementing those duties.
In Part VI, I also make an argument for granting a derivative right to
stakeholders to enforce the wholly-owned subsidiary director's duty to
the corporate entity. Finally, Part VII presents concluding remarks.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION:
HOW THE CORPORATION WENT FROM STATE-DOMINATED, TO MANAGER-
DOMINATED, TO MARKET-DOMINATED--AND THE GREAT DEBATE OVER
WHO SHOULD CONTROL How MUCH
The corporate form is a powerful device. David M. Kennedy,
professor of history at Stanford University, has described the limited-
liability joint-stock company as nothing short of "a very marvel of the
modem world economy, a historical force to rival religions, monarchies,
and even states. 22 Precisely because the current form of the corporation
is so dominant in our modem world, it is easy to lose sight of the myriad
of legislative choices that have gone into its current form, as well as the
22. As quoted on the back jacket cover of THE COMPANY, supra note 21.
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evolution of the debate over its proper role in our society.23 Therefore,
this article will begin with a short recounting of both the history and
theory of the corporation-reminding us that the corporate form and the
rules that govern it were not handed down on stone tablets, but rather
evolved over time and with much trial and error, and remain subject to
continuing re-evaluation.2
A. Early History: A Creature of the State
While the roots of the modern corporation can be traced all the way
back to Roman times, and through the Middle Ages, 25 this article will
begin its historical analysis of American corporate law in pre-colonial
England. There, the Crown granted corporate charters26 on a case-by-
case basis in order to facilitate the successful completion of various
risky endeavors.27 The Crown did this in part by leveraging the "subsidy
of limited liability" because "[c]olonization was so risky that the only
way to raise large sums of money from investors was to protect them.,
28
23. See, e.g. THE COMPANY, supra note 21.
24. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 696 (1974) (stating that "one can fairly hope that the
growth of the law in a civilized society should be evolutionary").
25. See THE COMPANY, supra note 21, at 4, 7 and 12:
William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century jurist, claimed that the honor of
inventing companies "belongs entirely to the Romans".... Two sorts of medieval
organization picked up where the Romans had left off: the merchant empires of Italy,
and the state-chartered corporations and guilds of northern Europe.... In the early
Middle Ages, jurists, elaborating on Roman and canon law, slowly began to recognize
the existence of "corporate persons": loose associations of people who wished to be
treated as collective entities. These "corporate persons" included towns, universities,
and religious communities, as well as guilds of merchants and tradesmen.
Id. (footnote omitted).
26. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188 (2nd ed.
1985) ("A corporation, in the jargon of lawbooks, is an artificial person.... Its life
begins with a charter;... The charter is a grant of authority from the sovereign ... ").
27. See THE COMPANY, supra note 21, at 17 ("The sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries saw the emergence of some of the most remarkable business organizations the
world has seen: 'chartered companies'. . . . Chartered companies represented a
combined effort by governments and merchants to grab the riches of the new worlds
opened up by Columbus (1471-1506), Magellan (1480-1521), and Vasco da Gama
(1469-1524).").
28. Id. at 18. This "subsidy of limited liability" is not to be confused with a
franchise. Id. at xviii. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 179 ("In the first half of the
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Later, in the colonial United States, the responsibility for granting
charters fell to the legislature.2 9 These charters were initially granted
primarily to further various public works projects30 and, like in England,
were handed out on a case-by-case basis.31 However, as a result of the
[19th] century, franchise was a key legal concept. The franchise was a grant to the
private sector, out of the inexhaustible reservoir of state power."). While the
corporation is no longer tied to the state by means of a franchise, it is still very much
dependent on the grant of limited liability. Cf William J. Rands, Domination of a
Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 421, 423 (1999):
Limited liability has been a prevailing rule in the United States for more than a
century. It is 'fundamental to the law of every jurisdiction in the United States.' The
United States Supreme Court concluded that 'limited liability is the rule not the
exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are
launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.' Limited liability as a policy has been
lavished with praise approaching hyperbole. The President of Columbia University
once called it 'the greatest single discovery of modem times.... Even steam and
electricity are far less important.'
(quoting Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991); Cathy S. Krendl &
James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 2
(1978); Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER
ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21 (perm.
ed., rev. vol. 1990)). However, even if it is possible for a corporation to contract for
limited liability directly with some parties, it certainly cannot do so with involuntary
creditors such as tort claimants. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991).
29. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 188, n.34 ("In England, only the crown had the
right to incorporate. In the colonies, royal governors, proprietors, and in some cases
legislative bodies issued charters .... It was generally recognized after the Revolution
that the legislature was the branch of government that made corporations." (citing JOHN
W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 1791-
1875 at 4 (1949))).
30. THE COMPANY, supra note 21, at 43 ("The early American states used chartered
corporations, endowed with special monopoly rights, to build some of the vital
infrastructure of the new country - universities (like America's oldest corporation,
Harvard University, chartered in 1636), banks, churches, canals, municipalities, and
roads."); John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 339 (2004) ("At the time of our Founding and
for several decades thereafter, corporations were quasi-public entities that 'functioned
very much like arms of government, usually serving some specific public end."'
(quoting JAMIL ZAINALDIN, THE LAW IN ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY: LEGAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC EXPANSION, 43 (1983))).
31. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 188 ("In the early 19th century... the legislature
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United States' distaste for the selective bestowing of privileges generally
associated with the Crown, and the clumsiness of the special charter
system, the process moved from special charters to general corporate
law.32
As the focus of government shifted from granting franchises for the
promotion of specific aspects of infrastructure to supporting growth
generally,33 the need grew "for an efficient, trouble-free device to
aggregate capital and manage it in business, with limited liability and
transferable shares., 3 4 The corporation -a separate legal entity35 that
divorced ownership from control-provided the answer.
36
granted charters by statute, one by one. Every charter was in theory tailor-made to the
case at hand.").
32. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 189:
The English tradition that corporate powers were to be granted only in rare instances,
never deeply intrenched here, was opposed by a strong and growing prejudice in favor
of equality - a prejudice which led almost at once to the enactment of general
incorporation acts for ecclesiastical, educational, and literary corporations.
(quoting 2 JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS, op. cit., 7-8 (1917)). See also Cary, supra note 24, at 663--64 ("In the
early stages of the American economy there were grants of special franchises
reminiscent of royal charters, but during the mid-nineteenth century there was a
revulsion against them as anti-egalitarian, monopolistic, and scandalous.") (footnote
omitted).
33. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 191:
Between 1800 and 1850, the essential nature of the corporation changed. No longer
was the business corporation a unique, ad hoc creation, vesting exclusive control over
a public asset or natural resource in one group of favorites or investors. Rather, it was
becoming a general form for organizing a business, legally open to all, and with few
realistic restrictions on entry, duration, and management.
34. Id. at 201.
35. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) ("A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law").
36. Cf Ribstein, supra note 28, at 89 & n.35 (identifying four corporate
characteristics: "continuity of life [legal personality], centralized management, free
transferability of interest and limited liability"). In addition to limited liability, the
corporation is also indebted to the state for continuity of life. See THE COMPANY, supra
note 21, at 11 ("[P]ermanence was the prerogative of the state. So it is unsurprising that
the state played a big role in the creation of corporations."). For a discussion of the
"agency" problem created by the separation of ownership from control, see generally
ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 584
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It is important to note here (and should be obvious upon reflection)
that the State did not grant limited liability to shareholders or
immortality to the corporate entity merely out of a benevolent desire
solely to increase the wealth of shareholders. Rather, the State saw that
its interests as sovereign, whether building specific pieces of
infrastructure or promoting economic growth generally, could be
furthered via the corporate form.37 As one commentator has noted:
In a perfect world, the three doctrines [of limited liability to
encourage investment, fiduciary duty to address the agency problem,
and the business judgment rule to encourage appropriate levels of
risk taking on the part of management] allow aggregate investing,
create a liquid stock market, and improve America's standard of
living by allowing corporations to make riskier investments than is
possible in other business forms. However, when the three doctrines
are used to solely maximize personal shareholder and/or director
wealth, then the economic policies underlying the doctrines are
undermined.
38
Thus, along with the excitement over using the corporate form to
facilitate economic growth, there was always a tension between
promoting growth and maintaining control-often expressed as a fear of
the perceived soulless nature of corporations and the lack of
accountability on the part of those who ran them.39
(1992) (describing and expanding on the "essential goal of corporate law - to restrain
managerial self-dealing").
37. See Trustees of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 637-38 ("The objects for which
a corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote.
They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the
consideration.., of the grant.... The benefit to the public is considered as an ample
compensation for the faculty it confers, and the corporation is created."). Cf Mitchell,
supra note 36, at 642 ("The suggestion, if not the requirement, that directors consider
the interests of all corporate constituents does.., reflect the desirability of a high level
of altruism in business conduct that by its very nature is designed to increase the quality
of life in our society."); Baker, supra note 30, at 340 ("In return for limited grants of
immunity, monopoly, and privilege to corporate bodies, the state retained the authority
to structure individual charters in the public's interest." (quoting JAMIL ZAINALDIN, THE
LAW IN ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY: LEGAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION, 44-45
(1983))) (emphasis added).
38. Enriquez, supra note 18, at 113.
39. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 513:
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Legislative control of the corporate entity was attempted in a
variety of ways, including direct state investment, limits on
capitalization and regulation of specific industries.40 The courts tried to
limit the power of corporations by construing charters strictly.
4
'
However, corporate charters were soon "framed so broadly that nothing
was beyond its power or its reach. 42  While restrictions on charters
faded, the law to govern the relationships of officers, directors,
shareholders, and creditors grew. "In this period, the courts wrestled
with problems of control of corporate management .... To what
standard of conduct should officers and directors be held? Case law
The offices of the 'great corporations,' ... were 'secret chambers in which trustees
plotted the spoliation of their wards'. . .. Modem society had 'created a class of
artificial beings who bid fair soon to be the masters of their creator'; they were
'establishing despotisms which no spasmodic popular effort will be able to shake off.
Everywhere... they illustrate the truth of the old maxim of the common law, that
corporations have no souls.'
(quoting CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, A Chapter on Erie, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1916)). See also THE COMPANY, supra note 21, at 33 ("[T]hey cannot commit treason,
nor be outlawed or excommunicated, for they have no souls." (quoting Sir Edward
Coke (1552-1634))); id. ("Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to
be condemned, they therefore do as they like." (quoting Edward Thurlow (1731-
1806))); id. at xiv ("This is a government of the people, by the people and for the people
no longer. It is a government of corporations, by corporations and for corporations."
(quoting President Rutherford B. Hayes));
Companies have proved enormously powerful not just because they improve
production, but also because they possess most of the legal rights of a human being,
without the attendant disadvantages of biology: they are not condemned to die of old
age and they can create progeny pretty much at will. This privilege of immortality,
not to mention the protection that the artificial corporate form has afforded various
venal people down the ages has often infuriated the rest of society.
Id. at xv; FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 194 ("The corporation was an object of great
controversy in the first half of the 19th century.... Corporations were creatures of
state, endowed with breath for the sole purpose of holding franchise or privilege, that is,
some power or right that no one else could lay claim to.").
40. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 511-25.
41. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 544 (1837).
'This, like many other cases, is a bargain between a company of adventurers and the
public, the terms of which are expressed in the statute; and the rule of construction in
all such cases, is now fully established to be this; that any ambiguity in the terms of
the contract, must operate against the adventurers, and in favour of the public, and the
plaintiffs can claim nothing that is not clearly given them by the act.'
(quoting Proprietors of the Stourbridge Canal v. Wheeley and others, 2 B. & Ad. 793).
42. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 519.
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looked to the concept offiduciary duty."4 3
Obviously, this article will discuss fiduciary duties in much more
detail in the coming pages, but first, it is important to cover another
significant aspect of the history of corporate law in America-the "race
to the bottom" 44 and "the market for corporate control."'45
Understanding this race to the bottom and the market for corporate
control is important because it provides an explanation for the current
state of the fiduciary duties imposed upon corporate directors. It also
provides a necessary background for better understanding both those
theorists of corporate law who argue that state interference in corporate
law matters should be kept to a minimum and those who argue that the
state has a responsibility to exercise its power to protect non-shareholder
constituents of the corporation. Once these theorists are understood, it
becomes apparent that one of the great divides that separate them is the
extent to which they believe market forces can meet the needs of
society. Then, by showing that those forces are absent to a great extent
in the wholly-owned subsidiary context, we can see that state imposition
of additional fiduciary duties is warranted in the wholly-owned
subsidiary context regardless of the extent t6 which we believe those
forces are effective otherwise. What follows is a brief summary of one
way of understanding the interplay of the race to the bottom and the
market for corporate control.
B. The Race to the Bottom and the Market for Corporate Control:
Setting the Stage for the Modern Debate about the Role of the
Corporation in Society
In deciding what types of fiduciary duties directors of wholly-
owned subsidiaries should be subject to, it is important to recognize that
the current makeup of fiduciary duties, imposed on directors generally,
resulted at least in part from a competition among the states to lure
businesses to incorporate in their jurisdiction. Obviously, the
individuals most responsible for deciding where to incorporate are the
43. FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 515.
44. Cary, supra note 24, at 666.
45. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POLITICAL ECONOMY 110, 112 (1965).
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business's managers, and many believe that therefore competition
between the states for a piece of the "incorporation pie" resulted
primarily in manager-friendly legislation.46
The following is one summary of the process:
The fact that business on both sides of the Atlantic was still rooted in
partnerships [in the late eighteenth century] did not make
partnerships perfect. Unlimited liability restricted a firm's ability to
raise capital. The untimely death of a key partner or even an heir
often killed the firm with it .... Businesspeople stuck to them
because they didn't like bringing the state into their private affairs.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the state began to step
back. It did so first in America .... There were three prompts for
change. The most important was the railroad [and their demands for
large agglomerations of capital].... The second was legal. In a
ruling about the status of Dartmouth College in 1819, the Supreme
Court found that corporations of all sorts possessed private rights, so
states could not rewrite their charters capriciously. The last prompt
was political. Concerned that their states were losing potential
business, legislatures, particularly in New England, slowly began to
loosen their control over companies. In 1830, the Massachusetts
state legislature decided that companies did not need to be engaged
in public works to be awarded the privilege of limited liability. In
1837, Connecticut went further and allowed firms in most lines of
business to become incorporated without special legislative
enactment. This competition between the states was arguably the
first instance of a phenomenon that would later be dubbed "a race to
the bottom," with local politicians offering greater freedom to
companies to keep their business .... New Jersey. .. in 1889 had
created the most liberal incorporation law in the country .... By
1901, two-thirds of all American firms with $10 million or more of
capital were incorporated in the state, allowing New Jersey to run a
budget surplus of almost $3 million by 1905 and paying for a rash of
new public works. Inevitably, other states fought back. Virginia
turned itself into what one legal treatise called a "snug harbour for
roaming and piratical corporations." . . . But the big winner of this
particular "race to the bottom" would be Delaware.
47
46. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 24, at 730 (explaining that modern statutes covering
corporations "are described as 'enabling' acts---enabling management to operate with
minimum interference").
47. THE COMPANY, at 45-46, 68-69. See also Cary, supra note 24, at 664 ("The
states, realizing that local restriction would be circumvented by foreign incorporation
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Arguably, as a result of this race to the bottom and the manager-
friendly corporate law it created, many corporations ended up being run
inefficiently because their managers had more incentive to maintain the
status quo (i.e. their jobs) than take the types of risks appropriate and
necessary in business to maximize the output produced by a particular
set of assets. Enter the market for corporate control, wherein corporate
raiders using a variety of financing schemes targeted companies whose
shares were trading below the liquidation value of the assets of the
business. The emergence of this market for corporate control helped to
refocus managers by making clear that those that did not get the assets
under their care to produce a reasonable return would soon find
themselves on the way out. In other words, the market for corporate
control made it too risky to stay risk averse. But the takeover boom
spurred by the market for corporate control also brought to light new
concerns for the various non-shareholder constituents negatively
affected by takeovers that often resulted in dramatic changes like plant
closures.48  The ensuing enactment of various antitakeover and
and eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, joined in advertising their
wares. In [Justice] Brandeis' words, the race was not one of diligence but of laxity.")
(citing Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933)).
48. See Hale, supra note 3:
Arguably, takeovers' deleterious effects were not immediately apparent. This is
partly because the drawbacks of takeovers and mergers were counterintuitive to the
fundamental assumptions of the time. Until this takeover phenomenon, profit
maximization was believed to be a strategy that benefited everyone. As Milton puts
it, 'larger pies imply larger servings for all.' It was not until the takeover boom that
some people realized a larger pie does not always get divided up equitably.
Id. at 832 n. 69 (internal citations omitted) (quoting David Millon, Redefining
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 241 (1991)); David Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373
(1993):
For much of this century, at least since the publication of Berle and Means' classic in
1932, the orthodox assumption has been that corporate law's objective is to develop
legal structures that will maximize shareholder wealth.... [However, h]ostile
takeovers, which seemed to promise so much for shareholders, ended up raising
serious doubts about the shareholder primacy norm that was their strongest
justification.
Id. at 1373-75 (internal footnote omitted) (citing ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)); id at 1389 ("For
too many people, the traditional shareholder primacy model has outlived its utility and
now threatens important values."); id. at 1390 ("Corporate law is currently in the midst
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stakeholder statutes (which will be discussed in more detail below) 49 set
the stage for a great debate among corporate law theorists as to the
nature of the corporation and its proper place in our society. The next
section of this article will address this debate, and a general overview of
this debate is important for our purposes here because I will argue that
one does not need to choose between these theories to support the
recommendations I make.
C. Communitarians and Contractarians: The Modern Debate
As alluded to above, many commentators believe the race to the
bottom and its concomitant manager-friendly corporate law resulted in
various stakeholders of the corporation being left on the outside looking
in when it came to being accounted for in a corporation's decision-
making process.50  Employees, customers and members of the
community in which the corporation is based are all in a type of
symbiotic relationship with the corporate entity. Not only are they in
many ways dependent upon the corporation, but the corporation is in
many ways dependent upon them. And yet the corporation can make
most of its significant decisions without having to consider the impact of
those decisions upon these stakeholders.
To address these concerns, Communitarians (the legal theorists
advocating greater consideration of various stakeholders) urge the state
to impose additional requirements upon corporations, such as additional
fiduciary duties, requiring them to consider these various stakeholders.
of crisis, because of the exhaustion of the shareholder primacy model.").
49. See Hale, supra note 3, at 829-30 ("The statutes are referred to by various
names, including 'nonshareholder' statutes, 'constituency' statutes, and 'stakeholder'
statutes.... Stakeholder groups include employees, consumers, creditors, suppliers, and
communities, among others."); id. at n.21 ("The term 'stakeholder' was originally used
at the Stanford Research Institute (now 'SRI International, Inc.') in 1963 and it meant
'those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist."') (quoting
R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 31
(1984)).
50. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at n.68 ("It has been argued that the U.S. system of
state-level corporate law has a built-in dynamic that produces statutes catering to
shareholder interests to the exclusion of nonshareholder interests."). See generally
David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1391 (1993) (providing a partial bibliography of
communitarian scholarship in the corporate law field).
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Communitarians do this in part by relying on the entity theory of the
corporation, which states that since the corporation is a separate entity
owing its existence to the state, the state can demand that the corporation
take on certain responsibilities in exchange for concessions granted by
the state, such as limited liability and immortality.'
At the same time, there are many who believe that economic forces
serve to mitigate any managerial bias of the so-called race to the
bottom.52 These Contractarians believe that "the corporation is a set of
contracts among the participants in the business, including shareholders,
managers, creditors, employees and others.... The policy implication
is that private parties to the corporate contract should be free to order
their affairs in whatever manner they find appropriate."53 They believe
that the entity theory of the corporation is no longer valid, 54 and thus the
51. See Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative
Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. LAW 35, 72 (1988) ("[W]hen
business participants seek the many advantages of the corporate form.. . a state, the
grantor of corporate status, may impose limitations of a kind not applicable to
extracorporate business activity, thereby effectively requiring the participants to
acknowledge the interests of others...").
52. See Bratton, supra note 5, at 1102-03:
The introduction of a microeconomic model of the corporation in the early 1980s
countered the antimanagerial case for intensified fiduciary controls. The economic
model.., assumes that individual self-interest motivates all relationships .... All
corporate actors become rational figures who take contractual steps to protect
themselves. Thus modeled, shareholders do not necessarily expect strict legal
protection under the fiduciary rubric. Instead, they primarily rely on competition in
the market for corporate control and the market for executive skills to assure
protection of their interests.
(citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 310 (1976), as first
articulating this economic model of the firm, and FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 171-74 (1991), as the leading
legal application).
53. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1990).
54. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 63, at n. 1:
The entity theory appears to support the approach that the "entity" is brought into
being, and therefore subject to extensive regulation (either through direct
administrative regulation or litigation) by the state. We will eschew language that
lends itself to a priori treatment of corporations as different from other contractual
relationships. The corporation is, indeed, a bundle of interrelated contractual
relationships, but there is no conceptual justification for reifying this interrelationship.
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state's prerogative to mandate duties beyond those the contracting
parties would have agreed to had they negotiated the matter is severely
limited at best.5
Even Contractarians should agree, however, that if we understand
the current state of corporate director fiduciary duties to be based at least
in part on an expectation that forces such as directoral independence,
institutional investors, and the market for corporate control will provide
certain protections of the corporate entity from individual shareholder
abuse, and we conclude that these protections are not fully available in
the wholly-owned subsidiary context, then it is fair to suggest that the
fiduciary duties that we otherwise rely upon should be expanded to
compensate for the loss of that protection. 6 Before getting to that point,
however, we should understand what exactly the current state of
See also William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contract" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 433-36 (1989) (arguing that the concession theory
has lost its vitality); Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, The Myth of the
Corporation as a Creation of the State, 3 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 107 (1983).
55. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 53, at 28 ("An important aspect of the
contract theory of the corporation, and one that is hotly disputed by the anti-
contractarians, is that fiduciary duties are a term of the corporate contract and therefore
consensual in nature."). (citing Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of
Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & Econ. 179 (1985). But cf Trustees
of Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 643-44 ("This [charter] is plainly a
contract to which the donors, the trustees and the crown.., were the original parties.")
(emphasis added).
56. Cf William J. Carney, Defining The Corporate Constituency: Does Defining
Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. Cim. L. REv. 385, 387 (1990):
Most of the groups considered constituencies of the firm are already in some form of
contracting relationship with the corporation. I will ask whether there is evidence of
overreaching by corporations in striking these bargains, fueled by market power,
information asymmetries, or other barriers to reaching outcomes that can fairly be
described as contractual. The only way we can conclude that constituency
representation will make a difference is if the board, in considering all these interests,
can conclude that prior contracting has allowed 'the corporation' to overreach one or
more constituencies in striking its bargains. Even if we find that a board could
conclude that the firm has exercised excessive power in a relationship, the question
arises who will pay for the cure.
Id, at 388:
I begin with the assumption that both product and factor markets operate effectively to
constrain both parties to the variety of bargains that form the firm. The evidence of
the competitiveness of most of these markets is sufficiently strong, so that the burden
is on those who claim markets are ineffective in protecting stakeholders to come
forward with evidence.
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fiduciary duties of corporate directors is generally. This will
demonstrate that the foundation for fiduciary duties running to
stakeholders is already in place, and asking directors of wholly-owned
subsidiaries to consider the needs of other constituents than the parent is
something they are already asked to do in certain settings.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS: MORE THAN MAKING
SHAREHOLDERS RICH
The debate over whom corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to,
and what the scope of those duties is, is a longstanding one.57 At least
some of the lack of unanimity on the issue of fiduciary duties stems
from the unique status of fiduciary duties in our law generally:
Fiduciary relationships present a problem of legal classification.
They lie in a gray area between the more clearly defined worlds of
government regulation and private ordering through contract. They
plausibly can be characterized as a species of either. Because the
fiduciary acts on another's behalf, the relationship implies a
beneficiary needing protective regulation. But fiduciary
relationships also are volitional and inevitably entail a measure of
private ordering, in many cases a large measure. As a result, the
same fiduciary relationship may be the subject of two sharply
contrasting descriptions with contrasting normative implications.
Depending on the factors emphasized, either legally mandated self-
sacrifice or unconstrained pursuit of self-interest in an environment
of free contract may be implied.
58
57. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1049 (1931) (arguing that corporate powers are held in trust for only the
shareholders) with E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932) (arguing that corporate managers are trustees for
employees, consumers, and the general public). But see Hale, supra note 3, at n. 119
("Berle's perspective prevailed as the dominant conception of the corporation.
However, after his view became accepted, Berle actually conceded that Dodd's view
was a better model. In other words, Berle conceded that corporations should act in the
entire community's interest rather than just in the shareholders' interest.") (citing Lynn
A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1189, 1208-09 (2002).
58. William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of
Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1084, 1100 (1993).
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It has been suggested that, "[r]ecognition that the law of fiduciary
obligation is situation-specific should be the starting point for any
further analysis."5 9 What follows is an examination of the current state
of corporate director fiduciary duties generally. This examination
focuses on whom duties are owed to, as opposed to what form those
duties take. The parties covered are: shareholders, the corporate entity,
creditors and other constituencies. Then, later, we shall examine the
situation at the level of the wholly-owned subsidiary.
A. Duty to Shareholders: A Foundation Showing Some Cracks
It is a well-settled and long-standing rule of corporate law that
directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders.60 The primary economic
justification for this is that absent such a duty, the cost of capital would
be prohibitively high as investors would be reluctant to turn their money
over to managers in light of the agency problem.6' In other words, it is
one thing for individuals to accept personal liability for a business they
are personally overseeing, but quite another to do so when others are
making the daily decisions. While the recent increase in institutional
investor power, along with increasing awareness of the impact of market
forces such as the market for corporate control, has weakened this
economic justification somewhat,62 the director's fiduciary duty to
59. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1988).
60. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed to that end.").
61. See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 595:
[T]he singular problem engendered by the separation of ownership and control in the
large, publicly held corporation is to restrain management from acting in its own self-
interest to the detriment of the corporation.. the general instrument designed to
address this problem is the broad principle of fiduciary duty ....
Cf id. at 603 ("The significance of analyzing the problem in this way is that it clarifies
that the current legal identification of the beneficiary as the stockholder-to the
exclusion of other constituent groups-is not a function of this duty, but of the means
by which this duty can be enforced.").
62. See Bratton, supra note 68, at 1105:
Shareholders ... appear less and less well-suited to the victim's role. It no longer
seems safe to assume that mandatory self-abnegation among managers promotes
investor confidence and lowers the cost of capital. The idea of investor protection,
which formerly served as the justification for introducing traditional values of
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shareholders remains a mainstay of corporate law.
A further justification for this "shareholder primacy"63 has been the
belief that what was good for the shareholder was good for all.64 Thus,
in the ordinary situation, the interests of the shareholders and the
interests of the corporation are aligned. This allows the interest of
shareholders to serve as "proxy" for the interests of the corporation.65
However, the takeover boom of the 1980s, which often created much
shareholder value at the expense of the corporations themselves and
their non-shareholder constituencies, caused many to question this
assumption. 66 Arguably, in recognition of this failure of shareholder
primacy, a series of celebrated cases explicitly recognized that there are
times when a directors' duty to the corporation as an entity may in fact
fiduciary law into corporate governance discussions, now carries little weight as a
policy imperative. The economic critique also increased sensitivity to the costs of
enforcing fiduciary duties.
63. See Hale, supra note 3, at 837:
By giving corporate leaders permission to consider stakeholders, stakeholder statutes
represent a radical change in corporate law. Prior to stakeholder statutes, corporate
leaders could not be sure if they were permitted to consider stakeholders' interests.
Corporate leaders could only be certain that they were "legally required to manage a
corporation for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders." This legal requirement,
known within corporate law as the 'shareholder primacy norm,' refers to 'this
conception of management's responsibility and also to corporate law's commitment to
shareholder welfare as the primary objective of corporate activity.' The shareholder
primacy norm dictates that when corporate leaders make decisions affecting the
organization, their decisions must aim to maximize shareholders' wealth.
(quoting Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REv. 23, 23 (1991); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L.
REv. 223, 277, n.2 (1991)).
64. See id. at 829-30 and 838-39.
65. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 36, at 586 ("[T]he basic approach has been to
equate the interests of the stockholders and the interests of the corporation . .
66. See Hale, supra note 3, at n.69:
Arguably, takeovers' deleterious effects were not immediately apparent. This is partly
because the drawbacks of takeovers and mergers were counterintuitive to the
fundamental assumptions of the time. Until this takeover phenomenon, profit
maximization was believed to be a strategy that benefited everyone. As [Professor]
Millon puts it, 'larger pies imply larger servings for all.' It was not until the takeover
boom that some people realized a larger pie does not always get divided up
equitably."). (quoting David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223,
241 (1991)).
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warrant action that is contrary to the wishes of shareholders.67 We move
on now to examine this duty to the corporate entity.
B. Duty to the Corporate Entity. Defending the Corporate Bastion
A good understanding of the director's duty to the corporation can
be gained from examing a series of cases from Delaware arising, in one
form or another, out of the takeover boom of the 1980s. These cases
make clear that: (1) the directors of a corporation are primarily
responsible for running that corporation's business; 68 (2) the directors
are protected in running the business by the "business judgment rule
[which] is a 'presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company' ,;69 (3) the business judgment rule may be modified when the
directorial decisions being challenged involve the imposition of takeover
defenses--due to the inherent conflicts of interest;70 and (4) when a
business is put up for sale, the primary duty of the directors becomes
maximizing the value the shareholders receive from that sale.71 What is
most important about these cases for our purposes is that, when viewed
as a whole, they leave little doubt that in running the business directors
have "a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise ' 72 that
includes consideration of non-shareholder constituencies.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld a selective self-tender offer implemented by the board of
directors of Unocal for the purposes of thwarting what the board saw as
67. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
68. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (1991 & Supp. 1992) ("The business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors .. "); Report of the Committee on Corporate
Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook Third Edition, 56 Bus. LAW. 1571, 1579 (2001)
("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority of, and the business and
affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of
directors .. ") (quoting the Model Business Corporation Act).
69. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)).
70. See id. at 955.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 958.
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a coercive tender offer by one of Unocal's shareholders, T. Boone
Pickens, Jr.-"a corporate raider with a national reputation as a
'greenmailer."' 73 In doing so, the court affirmed that "[t]he board has a
large reservoir of authority upon which to draw... [which] derives from
its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate
enterprise. 74 Exercise of that power would be protected by the business
judgment rule, the court explained, under which "a court will not
substitute its judgment for that of a board if the latter's decision can be
'attributed to any rational business purpose."' 75 However, the court did
note that in order for the business judgment rule to apply to a board's
decision involving takeover defenses, which may obviously be designed
primarily to keep the board in power and thus present the "omnipresent
spectre that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests,, 76 the
directors "must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed,, 77 and that the
defensive measure adopted was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed., 78 Finding both of these elements present, the Unocal Court
upheld the selective self-tender, even though it essentially pitted the
board against one of its own shareholders.
Unocal is important to us here for two primary reasons. First, it
highlights the role of the board of directors as managers of the business
as opposed to mere shareholder pawns. In fact, the case has been read to
stand for the proposition that "a board can make decisions in the best
interests of the corporation even if the shareholders would have
preferred other courses of action," and that this "necessarily implies that
the corporation is more than just the sum of its shareholders. 79 Second,
in discussing how a determination is made of whether a defensive
measure is reasonably related to the threat presented, the court included
"the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)" in
73. Id. at 956.
74. Id. at 953-54.
75. Id. at 954 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 955.
78. Id.
79. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 298.
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its exposition of factors that may be considered by a board in assessing
the impact of a takeover bid on the corporate enterprise.80 The explicit
mention of non-shareholder constituencies by the court is important
because it has been suggested that the ultimate reason the Unocal Court
gave directors a role in such a clear conflict-of-interest situation, and
stepped away from the court's usual formalistic mode of analysis in
order to do so, was because "more was at stake than simply stockholder
interests."81
The director's duty to the corporation was further developed in
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc. In that case, the board
of directors of Time, Inc., decided it would be in the best interests of
Time to pursue a merger with Warner Communication, Inc.83 However,
shareholder approval of such a merger fell into serious doubt after
Paramount Communications, Inc., made a very attractive "all-cash offer
to purchase all outstanding shares of Time for $175 per share," which
was $49 per share above the then-current trading price.84 Thus, Time
restructured its business combination with Warner as a tender offer, in
order to avoid a shareholder vote.85  The Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the decision to change the structure of the transaction, along with
80. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Cf Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("A board may have regard for various
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders.").
81. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 613.
82. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Cf Gouvin, supra note 5, at 299 ("The Time
opinion rests firmly on the premise that the corporation is an entity in its own right
whose interests are not always identical with the interests of its shareholders.");
Mitchell, supra note 36, at 611:
Ironically, the occasion for pronouncing directorial hegemony is a case dealing with
the permissible defenses against a tender offer. That directors have a role in this type
of transaction at all suggests the independence of their function on behalf of the
corporation. After all, a tender offer is nothing more than an offer by a bidder to take
up and pay for the shares of a corporation held by each of its stockholders. As such, it
is a private transaction between a selling stockholder and a buyer, with no corporate
involvement. When an offer to buy stock is addressed to all of the stockholders as a
group, the corporation, acting through its board, theoretically has no greater role than
when an offer is addressed to an individual stockholder.
83. Id. at 1146.
84. Id. at 1147; see id. at 1149 ("Paramount [later] raised its all-cash offer to buy
Time's outstanding stock to $200 per share.").
85. Id. at 1148.
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the adoption of various measures designed to impede Paramount's
pursuit of Time.86
The Time Court began, like the court in Unocal, by asserting the
"broad mandate" of directors "to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation."87 Then, following application of the two-part Unocal test,
the court applied the business judgment rule and approved the board's
actions. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiffs' claims that the
directors violated their fiduciary duties failed at least in part due to:
[A] fundamental misunderstanding of where the power of corporate
governance lies. Delaware law confers the management of the
corporate enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board
representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise
includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate
goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. Directors
are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan
for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy.
8 8
As one commentator has pointed out, "[w]hat is especially
noteworthy is that this result was permitted despite the fact that Time's
86. Id. at 1142; see id. at 1146-47:
Time's board adopted several defensive tactics. Time entered an automatic share
exchange agreement with Warner.... Time sought out and paid for "confidence"
letters from various banks with which it did business. In these letters, the banks
promised not to finance any third-party attempt to acquire Time.... Time also agreed
to a "no-shop" clause, preventing Time from considering any other consolidation
proposal, thus relinquishing its power to consider other proposals, regardless of their
merits.
See also id at n.5:
Time [already] had in place a panoply of defensive devices, including a staggered
board, a "poison pill" preferred stock rights plan triggered by an acquisition of 15% of
the company, a fifty-day notice period for shareholder motions, and restrictions on
shareholders' ability to call a meeting or act by consent.
Cf id. at n. 11, ("Time encouraged local cable franchises to sue Paramount to prevent it
from easily obtaining the [necessary] franchises.").
87. Id. at 1150.
88. Id. at 1154 (internal citations omitted); see Paramount Communications Inc. v.
Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, *30 (Del. Ch. 1989) (unpublished) ("The corporation law
does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the
firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of [the] shares. In fact, directors,
not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm.").
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board and management remained largely intact under the Warner deal,
whereas under the Paramount deal, they undoubtedly would have been
removed.... [a] classic conflict-of-interest transaction. ' ' 9  If such
directoral prerogative can withstand challenge in the public company
setting, where the perception is that the risk of abuse resides in the self-
interest of unchecked management, then how much more should that
prerogative be protected in the wholly-owned subsidiary context, where
the greatest risk of abuse arguably comes from the parent?90
But we are not finished with our examination of the director's
general duty to the corporation. There is a situation in which the
directors' primary duty is to maximize shareholder value in the short
term over all else, and that is when the corporation is being put up for
auction. These so-called "Revlon duties", as set forth in the case of
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,91 are imposed
when the decision to sell the business has already been made.92 What is
interesting about Revlon duties for our purposes here is that, by making
the maximization of shareholder value the sole goal of directoral
decisionmaking in the auction setting, they further affirm the director's
duty to the corporation as an entity in the ordinary case. For instance,
the Revlon Court explicitly stated that only after the corporation was put
up for sale had "[t]he duty of the board.., changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit."93 Only then
were the directors allowed to turn away from their role as "defenders of
89. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 619-20.
90. Ultimately, I will argue that the solution to the problem of the insulated nature
of the wholly-owned subsidiary is to either create a duty running to non-shareholder
constituents or grant them a right to enforce the directors' duty to the corporate entity.
91. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
92. See Time, 571 A.2dat 1150:
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without excluding other
possibilities, two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties. The first, and
clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to a bidder's offer, a
target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction ...
involving the breakup of the company.
(Internal citation omitted).
93. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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the corporate bastion.
9 4
One of the things these cases teach us is that, as highlighted at the
beginning of this Part III, "the law of fiduciary obligation is situation-
specific." 95  In the normal circumstance, the doctrine of shareholder
primacy is a satisfactory norm to guide directors in their decision-
making. There are situations, however, where horizontal conflicts
96
emerge between shareholders and other constituents of the corporation
(as well as the corporate entity itself) and the directors are at the very
least permitted to consider the impact of their decisions upon these
stakeholders and act contrary to the short-term goals of shareholders in
order to protect the corporate entity. Nevertheless, once the decision has
been made to sell the business, the directors' duties are adjusted once
again to facilitate maximizing the value received by the shareholders.
As we shall see in the next section, the situation-specific nature of the
corporate director's fiduciary duties does not end here. Coming within
"the vicinity of insolvency" 97 brings creditors into the scope of those
duties. All this, of course, supports the argument that the wholly-owned
subsidiary context presents its own unique situation-one that requires
an extension of fiduciary duties to include stakeholders.
C. Duty to Creditors: Protecting the Community of Interests in the
Corporation-Not "IF', but "When "
In 1939, Justice Douglas stated that a director's fiduciary duty is
"designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the
corporation-creditors as well as stockholders." 98  While the current
status of fiduciary duties to creditors is not universally consistent,99 the
94. Id.; see also Paramount Communications Inc.v. QVC Networks Inc., 637 A.2d
34, 46 (Del. 1994).
95. DeMott, supra note 59.
96. See generally Mitchell, supra note 36, at 592 (arguing that fiduciary duties
work well for what he calls "vertical conflicts" between the directors and shareholders,
but---due to a reliance on the shareholder norm-are inefficient in addressing
"horizontal conflicts" between shareholders and other constituents of the corporation).
97. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ.
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch.1991).
98. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939).
99. Compare Allied Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. AGFA-Gevaert, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1516,
1521 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("As president, director, and sole shareholder of Allied, Michael
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majority rule appears to be that where a corporation finds itself "in the
vicinity of insolvency" a duty arises to maintain corporate assets for
creditors. 00 This is at least in part due to the fact that "[t]he possibility
of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to
risks of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for
directors."' 10  Thus, "the general rule is that directors do not owe
creditors duties beyond the relevant contractual terms absent 'special
circumstances... e.g., fraud, insolvency, or a violation of a
statute. .. ."",,0'
Another interesting aspect of the cases imposing a fiduciary duty on
corporate directors to maintain corporate assets on behalf of creditors is
the justification that, since creditors make up part of "the community of
interest that sustained the corporation,"' 1° the creditors' interests can not
be ignored when certain difficult decisions concerning the future of the
corporation have to be made. As the Delaware Court of Chancery has
noted:
[I]f we consider the community of interests that the corporation
represents ... directors who are capable of conceiving of the
corporation as a legal and economic entity... will recognize that in
managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity
of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the
efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may
diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the
employees, or any single group interersted in the corporation) would
make if given the opportunity to act.
10 4
Thus, as we saw in the cases discussing the director's duty to the
Rubin owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its creditors."), with Bratton, supra
note 5, at n.46:
The [ALl's] Principles' [of Corporate Governance's] treatment of the creditors'
interest in the corporation makes a notable point of contrast. The drafters take no
position" on the matter of corporate dut[y] to creditors. They acknowledge that some
observers favor a duty to creditors, but note that Part V "does not treat" the matter as
such, leaving creditor protection to contract and bankruptcy law.
100. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34.
101. Id. at *34 n.55.
102. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'n Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) (quoting
Harffv. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd in part on other grounds,
347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975)).
103. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34.
104. Id. at *34 n.55.
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corporation above, there is more to running the business than following
the whims of the shareholders. 105 We turn next to a closer examination
of the specific duties running to the "other constituencies" that make up
the community of interests supporting the corporation.
D. Duty to Other Constituencies: A Work in Progress
In general, U.S. corporate law has left non-shareholder constituents
of the corporation (other than creditors) to fend for themselves under tort
and/or contract law. Even then, their remedy is held in check by
principles of limited liability, except where they can pierce the corporate
veil. 0 6 However, as has been pointed out, the takeover boom of the
1980s raised awareness of the limitation of shareholder primacy as a
means of best achieving the desired ends of corporate law. In response
to this realization, both the courts and legislatures sought to improve the
extent to which stakeholder interests were protected, or at least
105. The distinctions between a duty to creditors, a duty to the community of
interests that support the corporation and a duty to the corporate entity are not always
clear. See In re RSL Com Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff, 2003 WL 22989669, at *7-8
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003) ("[U]pon insolvency directors owe fiduciary duties to
creditors or, stated differently, to the corporation and to all of its interested
constituencies, including creditors and shareholders. [D]irectors must consider the best
interests of the corporation, and not just the interests of either creditors or shareholders
alone."). The fine lines of these distinctions are not as important, for our purposes here,
as the reconigition that duties exist beyond maximizing shareholder value.
106. See Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and German Law
- Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 187, 191 (1995) ("rules of piercing the veil ... can be applied only in exceptional
cases. German corporate law, in the context of affiliated entities, has a rather different
approach to the issue of disregarding an entity's veil of limited liability. In contrast, the
American law extends the equitable rules of piercing the veil to situations involving
affiliated entities") (footnote omitted); Rands, supra note 20, at 444 (noting "the
frequently expressed judicial reluctance to pierce the corporate veil."). Agency
principles and enterprise liability are other ways in which a parent can be held liable for
the actions of its subsidiary. Cf NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-03
(1960) (pointing out that even though "[t]he insulation of a stockholder from the debts
and obligations of his corporation is the norm, not the exception. 'Dominion may be so
complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will
be a principal and the subsidiary an agent."' (quoting Justice Cardozo in Berkey v.
Third Avenue R. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926))) (citations omitted).
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considered, during times of dramatic corporate change.'07
As far as case law goes, we have already seen that, in deciding what
corporate actions are in the best interest of the business, directors may
consider non-shareholder constituencies. However, as far as any
independent duty running to non-shareholder constituents, the best that
one can say under that case law is that since the Revlon court found
consideration of non-shareholder constituencies "inappropriate [in the
auction setting because] the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder"'0 8, those
constituencies must otherwise make up part of the corporate enterprise
to be protected. 109 Thus, like creditors who at certain times are
beneficiaries of independent duties running to them as members of the
community of interest that has sustained the corporation, so too should
non-shareholder constituencies like employees, customers, and members
of the local community"0 be beneficiaries of at least some type of
similar duty, at least under certain circumstances. However, there is
little, if any, case law available to provide either a means or a method for
any type of independent fiduciary duty to stakeholders to be exercised."'
107. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statues in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97, 103 (1991).
108. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
109. Cf Gouvin, supra note 5, at 311:
In the language of the Revlon court, concern for nonshareholder constituencies in the
change-of-control context is 'inappropriate' because the 'object no longer is to protect
or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.' This language
supports the idea that the concept of the 'corporation' includes the interests of
nonshareholders. This language implies a difference between maintaining the
'corporate enterprise' (in which context concern for nonshareholders is appropriate)
and maximizing shareholder value (i.e., selling the shareholder interests to the highest
bidder).
(footnote omitted) (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.)
110. See Carney, supra note 56, at 414-15:
Comntinities, including individuals, other businesses, school districts, and state and
local governments, make investments in specific assets in reliance on a firm's location
of a plant or facility in that community. Those investments frequently will be
dissipated if the firm later closes the plant and relocates, and no new employer
occupies the plant. All the road, water, and sewer improvements built to serve the
plant will become worthless, schools will become vacant as workers leave, and the
value of homes built in anticipation of continued employment will decline.
111. Cf Enriquez, supra note 18, at 105:
[N]o decisions specifically provide directors guidelines for determining what
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Statutory law, however, does provide slightly more guidance.
Connecticut, for example, has a stakeholder statute that:
requires the board to take into consideration the "long-term" interests
of the corporation and its shareholders, the interests of employees,
customers, creditors, and suppliers and "community and societal
considerations" when making decisions in connection with the
merger or the sale of substantially all the assets of a publicly traded
Connecticut corporation. 12
Meanwhile, forty other states permit consideration of other
constituencies by statute." 3 In addition, the ALl Principles of Corporate
Governance specifically allow consideration of non-shareholder
constituency interests." 4
While these "statutes have been... criticized by [some] legal
commentators,"'"5 their adoption by a majority of states demonstrates a
belief that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors extend beyond
merely maximizing shareholder short-term return. 116 In fact, they may
constituency interests should be considered. More importantly, no decisions provide
methods by which non-shareholder constituents can enforce their interests. Therefore,
since non-shareholder constituents lack standing to bring suit, directors have very
little incentive to consider them other than to justify their decisions made in the hostile
takeover setting.
112. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 312 n. 119 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313
(West Supp. (1995))).
113. Hale, supra note 3, at 833.
114. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 314 ("The Principles also permit the corporation to use
a 'reasonable amount' of its resources for 'public welfare, humanitarian, educational,
and philanthropic purposes.').
115. Id. at 313 (citing Carney, supra note 56; Hanks, Jr., supra note 107; and
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 23, 36 (1991) ("arguing that the 'gap-filling' function of the fiduciary duty should
apply only to the director-shareholder relationship because of the difficulties of
providing explicit contractual mechanisms to cover all aspects of that dynamic, while
on the other hand, nonshareholder constituents do possess adequate contractual
protections")).
116. Id. Compare Steven M. H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate
Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163,
163 (1991) (counting twenty-nine states with such statutes), with Hale, supra note 3, at
833 (counting forty states with such statutes in 2003).
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well constitute an approval of a concept of the firm that is lacking in
case law.' 17 At the same time, "[t]hese statutes raise many questions,
such as whether they give nonshareholders standing to sue....,118
What this brief overview of the current state of the law concerning
the responsibilities of corporate directors to stakeholders tells us is that
the foundation is clearly in place for an independent duty running to
stakeholders. Not only is the foundation in place, but directors already
cope with the reality of such additional duties in particular settings. As
one commentator has pointed out:
The concern over subsidiary director liability to nonshareholders is
not a purely academic enterprise. For example, in many cases the
directors of subsidiary banks have found themselves subject to
liability to the FDIC. The chain of events leading to liability begins
when a bank fails and the FDIC is appointed as receiver. As
receiver, the FDIC must maximize the value of assets owned by the
failed bank, including any causes of action the bank may have.
Therefore, the FDIC may bring claims on behalf of the failed bank
against the bank's directors for failure to take action in the best
interest of the bank. In addition, bank directors are personally liable
under federal banking laws."1
9
Thus, the foundation is in place and the reality is that at least some
117. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 313 ("[T]he real function of the statutes [may be]
to help the directors achieve their primary goal of discharging their duty to the
corporation, with the understanding that 'corporation' is broadly defined to include all
constituents that contribute to the corporate enterprise."). Cf Mitchell, supra note 36,
at 629-30 ("The Delaware Supreme Court's intermittent references to constituencies,
combined with the chancery court's explicit questioning of traditional corporate theory,
suggests that the case law of the nation's most important corporate law court is moving,
although tentatively, in the direction attained by constituency statutes.").
118. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 313. See also Enriquez, supra note 18, at 105-06:
[W]hile these statutes are generally supportive of other constituents, they fail to
provide non-shareholder constituents with a method for preserving their interests.
This is due to the fact that the statutes permit, but do not mandate, that directors
consider other constituencies. Thus, they appear to be nothing more than additional
tools for directors to use when justifying the use of defensive maneuvers in a Unocal
situation.
(citations omitted). Cf Mitchell, supra note 36, at 604 ("Given that the rights to be
asserted and duties to be enforced in the derivative action are corporate rights and
duties, it might seem that any constituent with a legitimate interest in the corporation-
for example bondholders-would be able to bring such a suit.") (citations omitted).
119. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 318 (footnote omitted).
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wholly-owned subsidiary directors already do more than simply serve
the parent. Let us now look more closely at the subsidiary in
particular-its historical background and relevant case law.
IV. SUBSIDIARIES: SEPARATE ENTITIES WITH THEIR OWN BOARD OF
DIRECTORS-THAT SHOULD MEAN SOMETHING
In this article, we are focusing specifically on the unique position of
directors of wholly-owned subsidiary corporations. The law in this area
is less than clear. 2 ' "In part, this lack of clarity can be attributed to a
lack of legal precedent, which, in turn, can be attributed to the fact that a
parent corporation is unlikely to sue the board of its wholly owned
subsidiary.' 2' For this reason, it is important to review the history of
the subsidiary as corporate entity and closely examine the few cases that
do directly touch on the area.
A. Historical Background: From Illegal to Dominant
In the early 1800s, corporations were prohibited from owning stock
in other corporations. 22 In 1888, New Jersey became first state to allow
corporations to own stock in other companies. 23 Some would argue that
this was just another part of the race to bottom:
120. See id. at 288-89.
Like all corporate directors, the directors of subsidiaries are bound by fiduciary duties.
However, as Justice Frankfurter observed more than fifty years ago, "to say that a man
is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry." In the context
of the parent- subsidiary relationship, a necessary inquiry is: To whom does the
subsidiary director owe the fiduciary duty? That simple question defies a simple
answer; it is not always clear to whom subsidiary directors owe their fiduciary duty.
Case law leaves subsidiary directors wondering whether their duty runs primarily to
the parent corporation as shareholder, to the subsidiary corporation itself as an entity,
or even to other constituencies such as creditors, regulators, employees, and
communities.
(citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943)). See id.
at 289 n.8 (citing Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)
("the whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one
that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.")).
121. Id. at 324.
122. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 520.
123. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at n.21.
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For the robber barons, [trusts] were a way of getting around
primitive antitrust laws prohibiting companies from owning shares in
each other .... [I]n 1892, the Ohio Supreme Court ... renounc[ed]
the trust agreement [of Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust] saying that
the trust had created a monopoly .... Standard's bold response-that
the only effect "will be to inconvenience us a little"-was partly
true. Rockefeller now had an excuse to begin moving his empire to
New Jersey, which in 1889 had created the most liberal
incorporation law in the country, with politicians even setting up a
company to handle the paperwork. The New Jersey law allowed for
holding companies-umbrella companies that own a controlling
proportion of the voting shares of subsidiary companies. 124
Since that time, subsidiaries have become a prevalent force in our
society:
Holding companies dominate our economy. In 1995, the ten largest
companies on the Fortune 500 owned an average of 62 subsidiaries
each. Many subsidiary corporations, though owned entirely by
another corporation, are themselves gigantic corporate enterprises.
For example, Philip Morris, the tenth largest U.S. corporation, owns
such major businesses as the Miller Brewing Company, Kraft Foods,
and the Philip Morris tobacco manufacturing operating unit. 15
Meanwhile, the law has for the most part treated parent companies
and their subsidiaries as separate legal entities 126 and, while there are a
variety of reasons why subsidiaries are formed, this "idea of parent and
subsidiary as independent entities is central to the primary reason for
forming subsidiaries-limitation of the parent's liability. ' 'i27 It is this
124. Micklethwait & Woolridge, supra note 21, at 67-68. See also Cary, supra note
24, at 664:
"In 1896 New Jersey adopted what is regarded as the first of the modem liberal
corporation statutes. As Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 562-63 (1933), this act is commonly credited with attracting the
incorporation of the New Jersey trusts, such as the old Standard Oil Company, which
were not trusts at all but corporations operating as consolidated or holding
companies."
(Internal citations omitted).
125. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 287.
126. See Enriquez, supra note 18, at 98 ("Legally, subsidiary corporations are
generally treated as entities that are separate and distinct from their parent
companies.").
127. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 321; William J. Rands, Domination of a
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confluence of factors-the important role of wholly-owned subsidiaries
in our society, the rights bestowed upon them as separate corporate
entities, their domination by a single parent, and the insulation provided
that parent -which create the "special circumstances" warranting the
extension of rights to the stakeholders of the wholly-owned subsidiary.
B. Relevant Cases: Wholly-Owned Subsidiary Directors-Not Just
Pawns
Our analysis of relevant cases focuses on two cases that, when
taken together, stand for the proposition that "[t]he directors of a wholly-
owned subsidiary owe the corporation fiduciary duties, just as they
would any other corporation. As a result the subsidiary has standing to
sue for breach of those duties."'28
1. Anadarko
In the 1988 case of Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle
Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988), the Supreme Court of
Delaware stated that "in a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary context,
Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REv. 421, 451 (1999) (stating that a traditional
strategy frequently used by corporate lawyers is to "tell the parent that it could
significantly limit the impact of environmental risks merely by establishing a subsidiary
corporation to conduct hazardous waste activities"). But see Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 (1984). ("[A] corporation may adopt the
subsidiary form of organization for valid management and related purposes. Separate
incorporation may improve management, avoid special tax problems arising from
multistate operations, or serve other legitimate interests.") Because lawyers also have
fiduciary duties to their clients, they should be wary of advocating strategies that may
operate as a sham. See, e.g., Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon.:
Observations on Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business
Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 513, 514 (2003) (exploring the obligation of the lawyer
to corporate clients and to society, including the duty to provide the client with
independent professional judgment).
128. First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10, 26 (D.D.C. 1998); see
Gouvin, supra note 5, at 294 ("Two recent efforts to clarify the underlying precepts of
corporate governance, the A.B.A.'s Corporate Director's Guidebook, and the A.L.I.'s
Principles of Corporate Governance, make no special mention of the role of directors of
subsidiaries. Perhaps this silence indicates that the duties of subsidiary directors are the
same as those for corporate directors generally.").
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the directors of the subsidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of
the subsidiary in the best interests of the parent and its shareholders."'' 9
In that case, a parent corporation had decided to spin off its wholly-
owned subsidiary via issuance of a stock dividend. 30 Before the
distribution of the stock dividend was completed (but after its
declaration) the board of directors of the wholly-owned subsidiary
approved a series of agreements between the parent and the wholly-
owned subsidiary which favored the then-parent company.' When the
distribution was completed, the new shareholders brought suit alleging
that at the time of the agreements the subsidiary's directors owed a
fiduciary duty to the prospective shareholders, which they violated by
entering into the agreements. 3 2  The court declined to find such a
duty.
133
The holding in Anadarko raises a number of questions. First, if it is
true that in some circumstances corporate directors owe duties to the
corporate entity as separate from its shareholders, then where does such
a duty fit in with Anadarko's affirmation of the Court of Chancery's
ruling that "as a matter of law the former directors of Anadarko owed a
129. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988) (citing Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971);
Goodman v. Futrovsky, 213 A.2d 899, 902 (Del. 1965)). This is a very interesting
conclusion to draw from the portions of the two opinions cited. Sinclair stands
primarily for the proposition that when a parent enters into a transaction with one of its
subsidiaries, that transaction must meet the test of intrinsic fairness where "the parent
receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the
minority stockholders of the subsidiary." Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720. If the minority is
not deprived of anything as a result of the parent's transaction with its subsidiary, then
any challenges of that transaction are subject to the business judgment rule. Id. at 722.
It seems somewhat of a stretch to equate these statements of the law with a
pronouncement that subsidiary directors are absolved of all duties other than doing the
bidding of the parent when there are no minority shareholders invovled. As for the
Goodman opinion, the best that can be said for it as far as supporting the Anadarko
Court's conclusion is that it states flatly in the portion of the text cited, that "the Cohens
and Lehrmans were the sole owners of Giant and could do with it as they wished."
Goodman, 213 A.2d at 902. It should not be too much to ask for more "analysis" than
that in order to justify turning corporate directors with statutorily conferred obligations
to manage an enterprise into mere shareholder pawns.
130. See Anadarko, 545 A2d. at 1172.
131. Id. at 1174.
132. See id.
133. See id at 1177.
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fiduciary duty only to the parent corporation, Panhandle, at the time the
disputed agreements were approved.' 34  According to the Anadarko
Court, the parent has no such fiduciary duty to the subsidiary corporate
entity.'35 Also, how does the Anadarko ruling leave room for corporate
directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries to carry out their state conferred
prerogative to consider other constituencies?
136
If Anadarko is read to preclude the directors of the wholly owned
subsidiary from considering any other interests than those of the
parent, 3 7 then:
There are at least two possibilities to explain the fate of the
subsidiary directors' duty to the corporation and other constituencies.
The first possibility is that duties to nonshareholders do not exist in
the wholly owned subsidiary context. This conclusion must be
wrong, or else shareholders could cut off any fiduciary duty to third
parties merely by placing all their operating companies in the
ownership of a holding company. The second possibility is that the
board of directors of the holding company bears a duty to the
"corporation" it directs, and that corporation is defined to include the
wholly owned subsidiaries. This approach seems workable, but case
law supporting it is hard to find. In this view, the duties of the
subsidiary directors would be imposed on the parent.
138
Fortunately, while Anadarko could have been read to broadly state
the rule of law in this area, a later decision severely narrowed the
interpretation of that holding.
134. Id. at 1172.
135. See Id. at 1174 ("[A] parent does not owe a fiduciary duty to its wholly owned
subsidiary.").
136. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 315 ("If directors of subsidiaries, like those of
other corporations, must or may take into account the interests of nonshareholders, how
does that consideration fit with the Anadarko assertion that the subsidiary directors owe
a duty only to the parent corporation?").
137. See Alting, supra note 106, at 221 (citing Anadarko for proposition that "if
there is no minority shareholder, fiduciary duties do not exist"). Gouvin, supra note 5,
at n.218 ("This is the position taken by the Delaware Supreme Court in [Anadarko] and
adopted as black-letter law in 3 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 852 n.4.50 (Supp. 1994), citing only Anadarko for
support.").
138. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 316.
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2. Al-Nahyan
In a classic case of how wholly-owned subsidiary directors can end
up answering to someone other than the sole shareholder, First
American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D. D.C. 1998), dealt
with the highly publicized scandal involving Bank of Credit and
Commerce International. 139  As a result of "complex and massive
fraud," 140 Al-Nahyan Corporation was placed into the hands of a court-
appointed Trustee. 141 The Trustee, as part of his duty to maximize the
assets of First American, pursued claims against the former directors of
First American for breach of fiduciary duties for, among other things,
entering into transactions unfavorable to First American solely for the
purposes of benefiting the parent. 142  The former directors of First
American responded by citing Anadarko for the proposition that the only
fiduciary duties they owed were to the parent. 143
The Al-Nahyan Court, however, responded by explaining that
Anadarko applies "only to the question of who are the shareholders to
whom the directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary owe duties when the
corporation is being spun off-the parent or the prospective
purchasers. ,1 44  As to the general duties of wholly-owned subsidiary
directors, the Al-Nahyan Court cited Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
139. See Miller, supra note 4, at 424, 451 (referring to the BCCI scandal as "[o]ne of
the most notorious [financial] failures of all time" and noting specifically BCCI's
"arcane and byzantine" corporate structure, through which it "operated in seventy-two
countries through an array of subsidiaries, divisions, joint ventures, and other corporate
vehicles").
140. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (quoting E. Gerald Corrigan, J. Virgil
Mattingly, Jr. & William Taylor, The Federal Reserve's Views on BCCI, 26 INT'L LAW
963, 970-71 (1992)).
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 14-16.
143. Id. at 26.
144. Id.; cf RSL Com Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff (In re RSL Corn Primecall, Inc.),
2003 WL 22989669, at *13 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y., 2003) Responding to argument that
Anadarko stands for the proposition that directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary owed
duties only to their parent in the case of insolvency by stating that:
It would be absurd to hold that the doctrine that directors owe special duties after
insolvency is inapplicable when the insolvent company is a subsidiary of another
corporation. That is precisely when a director must be most acutely sensitive to the
needs of a corporation's separate community of interests, including both the parent
shareholder and the corporation's creditors.
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QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993), for the proposition
that "[d]irectors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and to the
shareholders, taken as a whole. ' 1 45 Thus, "the directors of a wholly-
owned subsidiary owe the corporation fiduciary duties, just as they
would any other corporation[," and "[a]s a result the subsidiary has
standing to sue for breach of those duties."'
' 46
The Court in Al-Nahyan also went on to say, however, "[t]he far
more perplexing issue is to define the scope of the duties .... Those
questions will await future cases and further commentary for
answers."' 147 Thus, what we can take from Al-Nahyan is that the
fiduciary duties of the wholly-owned subsidiary director extend beyond
merely serving the whims of the parent, but that a need exists to define
the exact nature of those duties. The following section explains why the
duties of wholly-owned subsidiary directors should be expanded beyond
those of other corporate directors to include some form of duty running
to non-shareholder constituents.
V. WHY THE DIRECTORS OF WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO MORE STRINGENT FIDUCIARY DUTIES
It has been argued that in the wholly-owned subsidiary context, the
power of a parent entity is so great as to make it unrealistic to expect
wholly-owned subsidiary directors to consider any other interests:
[Corporate directors] understand that ultimate control of the
corporation rests with the shareholders, who can either sell their
shares to other investors or vote different directors into office. The
directors also understand that the shareholders are the only group
that can sue the board on behalf of the corporation. This
centralization of power in the shareholders focuses director attention
on shareholder interests to the exclusion of other interests.
... [These problems] are especially severe in the context of the
wholly owned subsidiary. If subsidiary directors owe the same
duties as directors of corporations generally, the subsidiary directors
145. Al-Nahyan, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
146. Id.
147. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Gouvin, supra note 5, at 290).
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may often encounter horizontal conflicts [between the interests of the
parent, the corporate entity and other consituents] on a regular basis.
Additionally, unlike the directors of a publicly traded corporation
whose shareholders may be widely scattered, poorly organized, and
more likely to sell their stock than to bring a derivative suit, the
directors of the wholly owned subsidiary have their one and only
shareholder looking over their shoulders on a regular basis. Since
the parent entirely controls the subsidiary's management, it is
unrealistic to expect the subsidiary directors to act solely in the best
interests of the subsidiary corporation even though such action
would ordinarily be required for corporate directors.
However, as we have seen, the argument that wholly-owned
subsidiary directors should be mere agents of the parent has already
been rejected. 49 This is proper in light of the statutorily mandated role
of directors and the legal precedent, which defines that role to include
consideration of interests other than solely those of the parent. 50 Even if
this were not the case, we might still want the wholly-owned
subsidiary's directors to be empowered to do more than act as mere
agents of the parent because they are closer to the entity itself and its
constituents. 151 What is important to note is that while the pressures
upon wholly-owned subsidiary directors do not excuse them from
148. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 304 (citations omitted).
149. See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 305 ("[T]he law has treated a parent corporation
and its subsidiaries as independent entitites.").
150. See, e.g., supra note 144.
151. Cf Hale, supra note 3, at 843:
Decision-making power was once vested within local communities where corporate
leaders were able to see the connection between their decisions and the well-being of
stakeholders. Now, however, most corporations are massive bureaucracies in which
key decision-makers might have little meaningful interaction with employees,
vendors, suppliers, consumer advocates, charities, or local communities.
See also Armond W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate
Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate
Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 360, 368 (2004) (stating that "[w]ell informed
and objective monitors-the board or shareholders-provide the most effective
supervision and monitoring," and arguing that "effective monitoring of corporate
management cannot exist unless the monitors possess the characteristics of either
proximity or objectivity" (emphasis added)); Charles M. Elson, Enron and the Necessity
of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 496, 497 (2004) (arguing that
"while active, nonproximate monitors may be helpful, the real key to the prevention of
Enron-type scandals centers on the proximate monitors, namely, the company's
directors").
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carrying out their duties, they do call into question their independence in
cases involving horizontal conflicts. 152 Generally, directors can shield
their decisions from much scrutiny by successfully claiming independent
decision-making. 153 Where independence is lacking, the result often is
that the directors do not get the benefit of the business judgment rule.
But without a stakeholder right to challenge directoral decision-making,
that "correction" becomes meaningless. Rather, an additional
mechanism is needed to keep wholly-owned subsidiary directors from
doing the bidding of the parent regardless of the costs. Effective
stakeholder statutes could provide such a mechanism.
This need for heightened directoral duties in the wholly-owned
subsidiary setting is particularly pronounced because market forces
generally available to keep directors' interests aligned with maintaining
the corporate entity they are overseeing and maximizing its performance
are lacking in the wholly-owned subsidiary setting.'54 There is neither
the presence of a large institutional investor nor an effective market for
corporate control.1
55
Normally, the interests of a large institutional investor would often
be in conflict with other stakeholders. But in a situation, for example,
where a parent wanted to "loot" its majority-owned subsidiary for its
own gain, a large institutional minority investor in the subsidiary would
152. See The Committee on Corporate Laws, Report, Corporate Director's
Guidebook Third Edition, 56 Bus. LAW. 1571, 1590 (2001) (stating that "[t]o encourage
an environment likely to nurture independence in fact.., most corporate governance
commentators recommend that at least a majority of the members of the board of a
publicly held corporation be independent of management and the controlling
shareholders"); Elson, supra note 151, at 498, (stating that board independence is "a
critical component of modem governance theory").
153. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at n.3 (citing "presumptions that generally attach to the
decisions of a board whose majority consists of truly outside independent directors").
154. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269, 303 (2004) (listing "takeovers, control
contests, institutional activism, and more aggressive boards" as the modem
"mechanisms of corporate accountability").
155. Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and
Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 394, 406-07 (2004) ("The market for corporate control is
an extremely powerful corporate governance device, and, in my view, the cornerstone
of U.S. corporate governance.").
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have both the interest and standing to protect the entity. 56  Such
protection is lacking in the wholly-owned subsidiary context.
Furthermore, while the market for corporate control normally serves to
focus director interest upon maximizing the performance of the
corporation, in the wholly-owned subsidiary setting, that market is only
operating at the level of the parent.1 57 Thus, should any conflict arise
between the interests of the wholly-owned subsidiary and the parent, the
directors of the wholly-owned subsidiary will be incentivized to focus
on the parent's interests. 5 8 All this leads to inefficiencies:
Currently, enterprises operated as corporate families enjoy too much
limited liability from the duties owed to nonshareholder constituents.
156. Cf Bratton, supra note 5, at 1105 n.99:
Corporate governance commentators have given up on the prospect of effective
market controls of management to grapple anew with the old problem of management
accountability. Ten or fifteen years ago, commentaries dealing with accountability
problems often recommended revised fiduciary rules as a solution.... Today, the
governance debate focuses on self-help by institutional investors rather than direct
legal control under the fiduciary rubric.
157. Cf Report, Managing Closely Held Corporations: A Legal Guidebook, 58 Bus.
LAW. 1073, 1084 (2003) ("Public company directors and officers are disciplined by a
market that reacts almost instantaneously to news. In contrast, closely held
corporations are not subject to SEC audit, reporting or proxy rules and have no
disclosure requirements imposed by market forces.").
158. For example, in a situation where a parent company's interests diverge from
those of its subsidiary, a subsidiary director's commitment to the well-being of
employees may be overridden by a desire to serve the parent, absent generally operating
market forces. Cf Carney, supra note 56, at 407:
Absent explicit contract terms or competitive markets to ensure contract performance,
many employees get their principal protection from managers' realization that
employees' goodwill is critical to the success of the business. To the extent that
managers are long-term repeat players, developing a reputation for fair dealing with
employees has payoffs for both managers and stockholders.... In these settings,
market forces or relational considerations provide the principal protection for
employees.
See also id. at 413 ("Where the expectation of repeated dealings is the motive for good
behavior,contracting frequently fails in the last period of dealings between the parties.
In these cases it is possible that constituency representation would make a difference.")
(internal citation omitted); Id. at 422:
These problems are not particularly bothersome as long as the firm is subject to
normal market pressures. Farsighted managers and directors will in fact consider the
preferences of all stakeholders to the extent that doing so promotes corporate profits.
The marketplace will constrain directors when they try to engage in
non-profit-maximizing activity.
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Consequently, the enterprise as a whole does not bear the full cost of
its activities. As a result, these enterprises seem more profitable.
These artificially profitable companies cause inefficient resource
allocation by attracting more investment capital than they should. 1
59
This is important because even Contractarians acknowledge that
such inefficiencies may justify imposing fiduciary duties. As one set of
commentators has noted in a different context:
Professor Coffee asserts that firms cannot distinguish themselves
regarding expected agency costs, which permits defalcating
managers to impose costs on better firms, resulting 'in an
unnecessary and socially inefficient increase in the average cost of
capital experienced by all firms. In short, there is an externality.'
160
As a result, according to Coffee, investors will overinvest in poorly
managed firms, and the quality of management and of corporate
contracts will regress to the mean, as in any "lemons" market. This
is a significant point because, if correct and the costs are large
enough to be relevant, it justifies imposing fiduciary duties and
derivative remedies even on firms that have reasonably concluded
that, for them, the burden of such remedies outweighs their
benefit.161
Thus, just like fiduciary duties are extended to creditors when the
corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, so should duties be extended
to other constituencies when horizontal conflicts are exacerbated by
corporate structure. Enforceable constituency statutes allow such an
extension."'
159. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 337.
160. One commentator has defined externalities as follows:
Externalities are economic side effects, arising when contracting parties' actions
affect third parties, who cannot be charged or compensated for the benefits or costs
they receive. Pollution is a classic example of an externality: Smoke generated by a
factory may impose health costs and cleanup costs on nearby residents who receive no
compensation for bearing such costs. Polluters benefit from externalities if their
production costs are lower than if polluters had to bear the total cost of their activities,
including those incurred by third parties.
Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 411-12 (2004).
161. Butler and Ribstein, supra note 53, at 36-37.
162. See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 584-85 ("[C]onstituency statutes permit
directors to allocate the externalized costs of rules restraining self-interest among the
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VI. THE ALTERNATIVES: MAKE STAKEHOLDER STATUTES ENFORCEABLE
OR GRANT NON-SHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENTS A DERIVATIVE RIGHT TO
ENFORCE THE DUTY TO PROTECT THE CORPORATE ENTITY
One major problem with any theoretical expansion of corporate
directors' fiduciary duties to encompass non-shareholders is that "only
shareholders have standing to derivatively sue directors for breaches of
duty to the corporation [and they] are unlikely to bring a derivative
action for the protection of 'corporate' interests unless their own
interests are sufficiently affected."1 63  This is a reality that can turn
stakeholder statutes into a mere means for managers to further entrench
themselves.' 64 Therefore, if it is correct that the unique aspects of the
wholly-owned subsidiary warrant extending fiduciary duties to
stakeholders in that setting, then states will have to provide a means for
those stakeholders to enforce those duties or else explain why they have
not.
Fortunately, a model for the enforcement of stakeholder statutes is
already available. Professor Mitchell has proposed a balancing test to
determine if directors have violated their duties to stakeholders that
continues to respect the basic premise that "directors are to act in the
interests of maximizing stockholder wealth.' 65  However, rather than
parties who benefit from those rules by internalizing those costs."); id. at 607
("[C]onstituency statutes permit the board to reallocate the cost of restraining
managerial self-dealing among the corporation's various constituents, while protecting
the board from incurring additional risks of litigation by stockholders who are unhappy
with that reallocation.").
163. Gouvin, supra note 5, at 303.
164. Cf Enriquez, supra note 18, at 105 ("[S]ince non-shareholder constituents lack
standing to bring suit, directors have very little incentive to consider them other than to
justify their decisions made in the hostile takeover setting."); id. at 105-06 ("[W]hile
these statutes are generally supportive of other constituents, they fail to provide non-
shareholder constituents with a method for preserving their interests.... Thus, they
appear to be nothing more than additional tools for directors to use when justifying the
use of defensive maneuvers in a Unocal situation."); Gouvin, supra note 5, at 304
("[T]he mismatch between the duty owed to all the constituents of the corporation and
an enforcement mechanism that allows only shareholders to bring derivative actions
causes nonshareholder constituents to bear more than their share of the risk of
detrimental director action.").
165. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 635; cf id. at 637-38:
[T]he test need not be limited to jurisdictions with constituency statutes. Delaware,
for example, lacks a constituency statute, but is the leading jurisdiction developing
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merely permitting boards to consider the impact of various actions upon
stakeholders, "boards would further be required to take into account the
extent to which such actions harm a range of statutorily identified
constituents."'' 66  Those stakeholders would then have a right to
challenge corporate actions that harmed them, but the burden would be
on them not only to prove that they were in fact injured, but also that the
injury violated some "express or implied contracts with the corporation,
legitimate expectations, [or] the like.' 67 Only then will the board carry
a burden, and that will be "to prove that its actions were undertaken in
pursuit of a legitimate corporate purpose rather than in the interests of
the board itself. For example, the board would have to show that it was
acting to promote the interests of stockholders... or of the corporation
as a whole."'
68
Professor Mitchell has also addressed what is most likely the
loudest question coming from critics of making stakeholder statutes
enforceable: "How can the board fulfill its fiduciary obligation to act in
the best interests of the stockholders, when it also is obligated to
consider the conflicting interests of a variety of other groups?"'
' 69
Professor Mitchell responds that:
As even the critics of constituency statutes recognize, directors have
long been permitted to consider factors other than the immediate
interests of stockholders, at least so long as a reasonably related
benefit to stockholders, however attenuated, results. Given the ease
with which such a reasonable relationship can be demonstrated,
together with the protections afforded directors by the business
judgment rule, it seems fair to say that substantial dilution of the
case law to permit broader directorial considerations. It would be a relatively easy
matter to extend this case law to develop a common-law duty not to harm similar to
that implicit in the constituency statutes.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 636.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 631; cf Hale, supra note 3, at 848 n.213 (noting that constituency statutes
"do not help corporate leaders determine 'how much weight should... be given to the
interests of one constituency versus other possible claims of the same constituency.'
The statutes also lack standards for determining what it means to 'consider' these
interests or how one should go about such consideration.") (quoting James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L.
REv. 97, 113-14 (1991)).
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stockholder primacy model has already been tolerated.
More importantly, the historical purpose of corporate fiduciary
duties has not been to exclude the interests of every group but the
stockholders. Rather, it has been to exclude the directors'
self-interest in performing their jobs in order to prevent harm to
those with legitimate economic interests in the corporation .... The
significance of analyzing the problem in this way is that it clarifies
that the current legal identification of the beneficiary as the
stockholder-to the exclusion of other constituent groups-is not a
function of this duty, but of the means by which this duty can be
enforced.1
70
Another commentator has proposed that a test based upon a
fundamental rights analysis may help guide directors:
How do we eliminate the conflict directors will face in meeting
shareholder expectations and society's long-term expectations? This
can be done by distinguishing legitimate shareholder expectations
from illegitimate shareholder expectations.
.... Legitimate shareholder expectations of public companies can be
inferred from the quasi-fundamental and fundamental rights
established earlier. Specifically, shareholders have quasi-
fundamental rights to have their shares of stock managed in a
manner that is free from self-dealing and gross negligence.
Shareholders have fundamental rights to obtain the highest price for
their shares of stock when it is obvious that the sale of the
corporation is inevitable. Illegitimate expectations are those that fall
outside of identified expectations and harm the corporate entity. 171
Finally, "to suggest that the test is imperfect is no answer in the
face of a recognized need to redress some of the dislocations created by
the parochial and outmoded focus of corporate law on stockholder
wealth maximization."'
172
Another possible solution is to give a defined set of non-
shareholder constituents of the corporation a derivative right to enforce
170. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 632, 603.
171. See Enriquez, supra note 18, at 114-15.
172. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 640.
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the wholly-owned director's duty to the wholly-owned subsidiary.
7 3
This may make sense for a number of reasons.
First, the goal here should be corporate entity utility maximization.
As we saw in our examination of the history of the corporation, "[t]he
objects for which a corporation is created are ... deemed beneficial to
the country.' 7 4 Of course, it can be argued that a corporation is of most
benefit to the country when it maximizes shareholder value and thus
serving shareholder interests should be the director's only duty. But, as
we have also seen, shareholder primacy has been shown to be flawed.175
The realization of this fact is what has spurred the evolution of
constituency statutes in the first place. 7 6 While in the "market-owned"
corporation the biggest obstacle to optimum corporate performance is
directoral self-interest--a problem addressed at least in part by fiduciary
duties to shareholders and fiduciary duties to the corporation enforceable
by shareholders-in the wholly-owned corporation the biggest obstacle
to maximizing the efficiency of the wholly-owned subsidiary is arguably
parental self-interest. This can be seen, by way of analogy, in the
majority-owned corporation setting where we see duties running to the
minority precisely because of the potential for abuse on the part of the
majority. 177  Similarly, a check on parental power is needed in the
173. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 INDIANA L. REv. 223, 271
(1991) ("Perhaps, however, it is preferable to think about management's fiduciary
obligation as a duty to the corporation as such, rather than to any particular
constituency."); cf Pepper v. Litton 308 U.S. 295, 307 (stating "[w]hile normally that
fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly by the corporation, or through a
stockholder's derivative action, it is, in the event of bankruptcy of the corporation,
enforceable by the trustee. For that standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the
protection of the entire community of interests in the corporation-creditors as well as
stockholders."); see alsoYaniv Grinstein, Complementary Perspectives on "Efficient
Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron ", 89 CORNELL L. REv. 503, 504-06
(2004) (noting that "[l]ike other monitors, the board of directors should have the
knowledge and incentives to execute its duties properly. In general, the sources of
board incentives may be divided into three groups-ethical, legal, and monetary' ....
The second source of incentives comes from fear of legal punishment. Shareholders,
employees, and other stakeholders can sue board members who violate their duties.").
174. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1918).
175. See discussion supra, Part III (A).
176. See discussion supra, Part III (A) & (B).
177. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (noting "the
long-existing principle of Delaware law that [parent-]designated directors on [a
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wholly-owned subsidiary context if the wholly-owned subsidiary
director's duty to the corporation is to have any meaning at all.'78
Granting non-shareholder constituents rights to enforce that duty can
serve that purpose.
A second reason why granting non-shareholder constituents rights
to enforce the wholly-owned subsidiary director's duty to the
corporation may be a viable solution is that such a right can be tailored
to respect the legitimate power of the parent as sole shareholder more
than a duty running directly to non-shareholder constituents. To begin
with, there is the "impediment" of derivative action, which requires
claimants to make a demand upon the board of the entity. 79
Furthermore, the directors of the subsidiary could be granted the
protection of a modified business judgment rule that would allow them
to make decisions to benefit the parent at the expense of the subsidiary
so long as the benefit to the parent outweighed the cost to the subsidiary.
Only where the loss incurred by the subsidiary clearly was greater than
the advantage gained by the parent would a claim be viable. This is also
not unlike what has been done in the majority/minority context. 80
subsidiaryl's board still owed [the subsidiary] and its shareholders an uncompromising
duty of loyalty," and that "[t]here is no dilution of this obligation where one holds dual
or multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context"); see also Jones v.
Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969):
[T]he [California] Courts of Appeal have often recognized that majority shareholders,
either singly or acting in concert to accomplish a joint purpose, have a fiduciary
responsibility to the minority and to the corporation to use their ability to control the
corporation in a fair, just, and equitable manner.... Any use to which they put the
corporation... must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's
business.
Cf Closely Held Guidebook, supra note 157, at 1108:
[C]ourts have generally imposed a duty of fairness on controlling shareholders in their
dealings with the controlled corporation and its noncontrolling shareholders. Some
courts have referred to this duty as one of 'entire' or 'intrinsic' fairness, encompassing
both a duty of substantive fairness (i.e., fair price) and procedural fairness (i.e., fair
dealing and full disclosure).
178. See discussion supra, Part V.
179. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 192 (Del. 1988) (affirming dismissal of
derivative action for failure of plaintiffs to make presuit demand upon board of
directors).
180. Cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675, 1709 (describing the rule from Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976), as shifting "the burden from the fiduciary
who has demonstrated a legitimate business purpose to the beneficiary who, to prevail,
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The third reason that granting non-shareholder constituents a
derivative right would make sense is that it would avoid directoral
conflicts arising from having duties flowing to various stakeholders.
The directors would be left with the same fiduciary duties they have
today-their duty to the parent and their duty to the entity--except that,
their duty to the corporation would now actually have teeth.
Finally, there is one last alternative that warrants brief mention.
Parent corporations could be given the ability to opt out of the limited
liability that protects them from the liabilities of their wholly-owned
subsidiary in exchange for the right to control that subsidiary as they
deem fit. My expectation would be that there would not be a rush to
accept this bargain, but it would be interesting to find out since much of
my argument here is based upon the premise that it is the grant of
limited liability that gives the state the prerogative to impose the
additional duties we have been discussing. As one commentator has
noted:
Adherence to the Landers model of proper behavior for a corporate
group should be a prerequisite for sustaining the parent's limited
liability. In a nutshell, the model requires that the parent structure the
subsidiary so that it has a realistic potential for profitability. More
particularly, the parent should adequately capitalize its subsidiary,
avoid treating it as a department or a division, and avoid
commingling or stripping its assets. Though the standard of conduct
may not comport with the group's dominant motivation, which is to
maximize a return for the enterprise as a whole, this author is willing
to take the normative stance that adherence to this informal code of
good conduct is the price that a parent corporation should be
required to pay to preserve its limited liability. The law can say,
"Treat your subsidiary like an independent, profit-making enterprise,
and we will give you limited liability. That is what we ask of other
corporations, and we ask it of you, too."'
18 1
must then demonstrate that the majority could have achieved its business goal through
methods less harmful to the beneficiary").
181. Rands, supra note 20, at 456; cf Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968) ("[S]ince respondents Midas and International availed
themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations, the fact of
common ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that the law
imposes on separate entities."). It may also be necessary to grant stakeholders the right
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These are all obviously just suggestions that will hopefully lead to
further dialogue. The point is that there is a problem at the wholly-
owned subsidiary level. While today's wholly-owned subsidiary can be
as large as any independent corporation and have just as much impact on
non-shareholder constituents, the forces that we rely on in other contexts
to justify not extending additional duties or rights to those constituents
are lacking. 82 Thus, some type of mechanism is needed to correct the
resulting inefficiency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, what this paper proposes is ultimately quite
straightforward. First, I argue that the current state of the law imposes
upon corporate directors a fiduciary duty to act not only in the best
interests of the shareholders but also the corporate entity-and that
acting in the best interests of the corporate entity includes taking into
consideration the effect of corporate action on non-shareholder
constituents. 8 3 Second, I argue that the current state of the law makes
no concession as to this duty to the corporate entity in the case of the
wholly-owned subsidiary director. 184 Third, I argue that the current state
of general corporate fiduciary law represents a bargain between the state
and the private sector that assumes certain market forces will focus
director interests on fulfilling their fiduciary duties.'85 Finally, I argue
that since at least some of those market forces are absent in the wholly-
owned subsidiary context, the scope of fiduciary duties imposed on
corporate directors acting in that setting should be expanded. 1
8 6
to sue the parent in cases where the parent removes directors, or otherwise retaliates
against directors, solely for the purposes of thwarting the goals of these new rules.
182. See discussion supra, Part V.
183. See discussion supra, Part III (D).
184. See discussion supra, Part IV (B).
185. See discussion supra, Part V.
186. See discussion supra, Part VI.
